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Abstract. Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds
with private interests: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup con-
flicts, are at their core social dilemmas.
Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have
been studied by economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scien-
tists. These studies typically explain tendency to cooperation by dividing people in
proself and prosocial types, or appealing to forms of external control or, in iterated
social dilemmas, to long-term strategies.
But recent experiments have shown that cooperation is possible even in one-shot
social dilemmas without forms of external control and the rate of cooperation typically
depends on the payoffs. This makes impossible a predictive division between proself
and prosocial people and proves that people have attitude to cooperation by nature.
The key innovation of this article is in fact to postulate that humans have attitude
to cooperation by nature and consequently they do not act a priori as single agents,
as assumed by standard economic models, but they forecast how a social dilemma
would evolve if they formed coalitions and then they act according to their most opti-
mistic forecast. Formalizing this idea we propose the first predictive model of human
cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not
explained by the standard model. We show also that the model makes satisfactorily
accurate quantitative predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social
dilemmas.
Key words and phrases. Cooperation, Social Dilemmas, Prisoner’s dilemma, Public
goods, Traveler’s dilemma, Tragedy of the Commons.
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds with private
interests [1]. In other words, they describe situations in which the fully selfish and ra-
tional behavior leads to an outcome smaller than the one the individuals would obtain if
they acted collectively. Social dilemmas create then a tension between private interests
and public interests, between selfishness and cooperation. Classically, several different
social dilemmas have been distinguished, including the Prisoner’s dilemma, Chicken,
Assurance, Public Goods, the Tragedy of the Commons [2], and, more recently, the
Traveler’s dilemma [3], [4] . Each of these games has been studied by researchers from
different disciplines, as economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political
scientists, because of the intrinsic philophical interest in understanding human nature
and since many concrete and important situations, as pollution, depletion of natural
resources, and intergroup conflict, can be modelled as social dilemmas.
The classical approaches explain tendency to cooperation dividing people in proself and
prosocial types [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], or appealing to forms of external control [10],
[11], [12], or to long-term strategies in iterated social dilemmas [13]. But, over the
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years many experiments have been accumulated to show cooperation even in one-shot
social dilemmas without external control [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. These
and other earlier experiments [21], [22], [23], [24] have also shown that the rate of
cooperation in the same game depends on the particular payoffs, suggesting that most
likely humans are engaged in some sort of indirect reciprocity [25], [26] and the same
person may behave more or less cooperatively depending on the payoffs. Consequently,
the problem of making a predictive division in proself and prosocial types becomes ex-
tremely difficult, if not even impossible.
From these experiments, we can argue two conclusions: first, the observation of coop-
eration in one-shot social dilemmas without external controls suggests that the origin
of cooperation relies in the human nature; second, the fact that the rate of cooperation
depends on the payoffs suggests that it could be computed, at least approximatively,
using only the payoffs. The word approximatively stands for the fact that numerous
experimental studies have shown that cooperation is based on a number of factors, as
family history, age, culture, gender, even university course [27], religious beliefs [19],
and decision time [28]. Therefore, we cannot expect a theory able to say, given only the
payoffs, the individual-level rate of cooperation in a social dilemma. We can expect in-
stead a model predicting quite accurately population average behaviour using the mean
value of parameters that could be theoretically updated at an individual-level.
In this article we make the first step in this direction: (1) we develop the first predictive
model of cooperation1; (2) we show that it explains a number of puzzling experimen-
tal findings that are not explained by the standard economic model, such as the fact
that the rate of cooperation in the Prisoner’s dilemma increases when the cost-benefit
ratio decreases, the rate of cooperation in the Traveler’s dilemma increases when the
bonus/penalty decreases, the rate of cooperation in the Public Goods game increases
when the pro-capite marginal return increases, the rate of cooperation in the Chicken
game is larger than the rate of cooperation in the Prisoner’s dilemma with similar
payoffs; (3) we show that it makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative predictions of
population average behaviour in social dilemmas.
The key idea behind the model is very simple: since experimental data suggest that
humans have attitude to cooperation by nature, we formalize the intuition that people
do not act a priori as single agents, but they forecast how the game would be played if
they formed coalitions and then they act according to their most optimistic forecast.
We anticipate that forecasts will be defined by making a comparison between incen-
tive and risk for an agent i to deviate from the collective interest. This comparison
leads to associate a probability to the event “agent i defects”. As mentioned, we will
show that this procedure works satisfactorily well in the prediction of population aver-
age behavior. The problem in passing to individual-level predictions is that the event
“player i defects”, given only the payoffs, is not measurable at an individual-level in
any universal and objective sense and the dream is to use the factors mentioned above
1We mention that there are many other models that can be applied to explain deviation towards
cooperation in social dilemmas, including the cognitive hierarchy model [29], the quantal level-k theory
[31], the level k-theory [32], the quantal response equilibrium [30], the inequity aversion models [33], [34]
and the noisy introspection model [35]. Nevertheless, all these models use free parameters and so they
are not predictive, but descriptive.
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(family history, age, culture, incentives, iterations2, etc.) to define parameters to update
the measure of the event “player i defects” at an individual-level.
Even though our model is very general and can be applied to every symmetric game,
we treat explicitly only four but very relevant and widely studied social dilemmas: the
Prisoner’s dilemma, the Traveler’s dilemma, the Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the
Commons. We begin with a short review of these games.
Prisoner’s dilemma. Two players can choose to either “Cooperate” or “Defect”. If
both players cooperate, they both receive the monetary reward, R, for cooperating. If
one player defects and the other cooperates, then the defector receives the temptation
payoff, T , while the other receives the sucker payoff, S. If both players defect, they both
receive the punishment payoff, P . Payoffs are subject to the condition T > R > P > S.
Traveler’s dilemma. Fix a bonus/penalty b ≥ 2. Two travelers have to claim
for a reimbursement between 180 and 300 monetary units for their (identical) luggage
that has been lost by the same air company. The air company wants to avoid that
the travelers ask for unreasonably high reimbursements and so it decides to adopt the
following rule: the traveler who claims the lowest, say m, gets a reimbursement of m+ b
monetary units, and the other one gets a reimbursement of only m− b monetary units.
If both players claim the same, m, then they both get reimbursed of m monetary units.
Public Goods game. N agents receive an initial endowment of y > 0 monetary
units and simultaneously choose an amount 0 ≤ xi ≤ y to contribute to a public pool.
The total amount in the pot is multiplied by α0 and then divided equally by all group
members. So agent i receives a payoff of ui(x1, . . . , xN ) = y − xi + α(x1 + . . . + xN ),
where α = α0/N . The number α is assumed to belong to the interval (1/N, 1) and it is
called constant marginal return.
Tragedy of the commons. Consider a village with N farmers, that has limited
grassland. Each of the N farmers has the option to keep a sheep or not. Let the mon-
etary utility of milk and wool from the sheep be h > 0. Let the monetary damage
to the environment from one sheep grazing over the grassland be denoted by k0 > 0.
Assume h < k0 < hN and let k = k0/N . Let xi be a variable that takes values 0 or
1 and denotes whether the farmer i keeps the sheep or not. The payoff of farmer i is
ui(x1, . . . , xN ) = hxi − k(x1 + . . . + xN ).
All these games share the same feature: selfish and rational behavior leads to subop-
timal outcomes. In the Prisoner’s dilemma, the unique Nash equilibrium is to defect,
while both players would be better off if they both cooperate; in the Traveler’s dilemma,
the unique Nash equilibrium is to claim for the lowest possible amount, producing an
outcome smaller than the one they would obtain if they both claim for the largest possi-
ble amount; in the Public Goods game, the unique Nash equilibrium is not to contribute
anything, while all players would be better off if they all contribute everything; in the
Tragedy of the Commons, the unique Nash equilibrium is to keep the sheep, while all
farmers would be better off if they all agree not to keep the sheep.
1. An informal description of the model
Before introducing the model in general, we describe it informally in a particular case.
Consider the Prisoner’s dilemma (recently experimented using MTurk in [20]) with
2An attempt to extend the present model to iterated social dilemmas has been done in [36], leading
to very positive results: the predictions get very close to experimental data as the number of iterations
increases.
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monetary outcomes (expressed in dollars) T = 0.20, R = 0.15, P = 0.05, S = 0. The
idea is that players forecast how the game would be played if they formed coalitions.
In a two-player game there are only two possible coalition structures: in the selfish
coalition structure ps players are supposed to follow their private interests and in the
cooperative coalition structure pc they are supposed to follow the collective interest.
The analysis of these two coalition structures proceed as follows:
• In ps players follow their private interest and therefore, by definition, they play
the Nash equilibrium (D,D). Since there is no incentive to deviate from a Nash
equilibrium, each player gets 0.05 for sure and we say that the value of ps is
0.05 and write v(ps) = 0.05.
• To define the value of pc we argue as follows. If the players follow the collective
interest, their largest possible payoff is 0.15 in correspondence to the profile of
strategies (C,C). Since this profile of strategies is not stable (i.e., each player has
a non-zero incentive to deviate from it), we introduce a probability to measure
how likely such deviations are. To define this probability, we observe that:
– the incentive to deviate from the collective interest is D(pc) := 0.05, since
each player can get 0.20 instead of 0.15, if she defects and the other coop-
erate;
– the risk to deviate from the collective interest is R(pc) := 0.10, since each
player can get only 0.05 instead of 0.15 if she follows her private interest
but also the other one does the same.
We define the prior probability that a player abandons the coalition structure
pc by making a sort of proportion between incentive and risk. Specifically, we
define the probability that a player abandons pc to be D(pc)[D(pc) +R(pc)]
−1.
Now, note that the smallest payoff achievable by a player when she follows pc
but the other player does not is the sucker payoff S = 0. Therefore, we define
v(pc) = 0.15 ·
(
1−
D(pc)
D(pc) +R(pc)
)
+ 0 ·
D(pc)
D(pc) +R(pc)
= 0.10.
The numbers v(ps) and v(pc) are interpreted as forecasts of the expected payoff for an
agent playing according to ps and pc, respectively. Since v(ps) = 0.05 and v(pc) = 0.10,
the most optimistic forecast is in correspondence of the cooperative coalition structure
pc. We use this best forecast to generate common beliefs or, in other words, to make
a tacit binding between the players: to play only strategies which give a payoff of at
least 0.10 to both players. More formally, we restrict the set of profiles of strategies
and we allow only profiles σ = (σ1, σ2), such that ui(σ) ≥ 0.10, for all i. We define the
cooperative equilibrium to be the unique Nash equilibrium of this restricted game.
From Fig. 1, it is clear that the cooperative equilibrium is in correspondence of the
point in the red set that is closest to (D,D). This point can be computed directly by
finding the smallest λ such that
0.15λ2 + 0.2λ(1 − λ) + 0.05(1 − λ)2 ≥ 0.1,
that is λ = 12 . Consequently, the cooperative equilibrium of this variant of the
Prisoner’s dilemma is 12C +
1
2D for both players. Notice that in [20] it has been
reported that players cooperated with probability 58 per cent in one treatment and 65
per cent in another treatment and the over-cooperation in the second experiment was
explained in terms of framing effect due to the different ways in which the same game
was presented.
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Figure 1. The unit square represents the initial set of available profiles
of strategies: player 1 can use all strategies λC+(1−λ)D, for all λ ∈ [0, 1];
player 2 can use all strategies µC + (1 − µ)D, for all µ ∈ [0, 1]. The red
set represents the set of allowed profiles of strategies in the restricted
game.
2. The model
We now describe the general model. We recall that, motivated by the observation
that attitude to cooperation seems to be intrinsic in the human nature, our main idea
is to assume that players do not act a priori as single agents, but they forecast how
the game would be played if they formed coalitions and then they play according to
their most optimistic forecast. The only technical difficulty to formalize this idea is
to define the forecasts. Following the example described in the previous section, they
will be defined by assigning to each player i and to each partition p of the player set
P , interpreted as a possible coalition structure, a number vi(p) which represents the
expected payoff of player i when she plays according to the coalition structure p. This
value will be indeed defined as an average
vi(p) =
∑
J⊆P\{i}
ei,J(p)τi,J(p),
where τi,J(p) represents the prior probability that players i assigns to the event “players
in J abandon the coalition structure p” and ei,J(p) is the infimum of payoffs of player
i when she plays according to the coalition structure p and players in J abandon the
coalition.
This idea is very general and indeed, in a long-term working paper, we are developping
the theory for every normal form game [37]. In case of the classical social dilemmas in
consideration the theory is much easier, because of their symmetry.
• Symmetry. All players have the same set of strategies S and for each player i,
for each permutation pi of the set of players and for each (σ1, . . . , σN ) ∈ S
N one
has
ui(σ1, . . . , σN ) = upi(i)(σpi(1), . . . , σpi(N)). (1)
Coming to the description of the model, let G be a symmetric game and denote P
the set of players, each of which has pure strategy set Si, mixed strategies P(Si) and
payoff function ui. We start by assuming, for simplicity, that P = {1, 2} and we will
explain, at the end of this section, how the model generalizes to N -player games.
A coalition structure is a partition p of the set of players, that is a collection of
pairwise disjoint subsets of P whose union covers P . Every set in the partition is
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called coalition. Given a coalition structure p, we denote by Gp the game associated to
p, whose players in the same coalition play as a single player whose payoff is the sum
of the payoffs of the players belonging to that coalition. Call Nash(Gp) the set of Nash
equilibria of the game Gp. Now fix i ∈ P and let −i denote the other player. We denote
by D−i(p) the maximal payoff that player −i can obtain leaving the coalition structure
p. Formally,
D−i(p) := sup{u−i(σ
p
i , σ−i)− u−i(σ
p
i , σ
p
−i) : σ−i ∈ P(S−i), σ
p ∈ Nash(Gp)}. (2)
D−i(p) will be called incentive of player −i to abandon the coalition structure p.
Given a profile of strategies (σ1, σ2), a strategy σ
′
i ∈ P(Si) is called i-deviation from
(σ1, σ2) if ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) ≥ ui(σ1, σ2).
We denote by R−i(p) the maximal loss that players −i can incur if she decides to
leave the coalition structure p to try to achieve her maximal possible gain, but also
player i deviates from the coalition structure p either to follow her selfish interests or
to anticipate player −i’s deviation. Formally,
R−i(p) := sup{u−i(σ
p
i , σ
p
−i)− u−i(σi, σ−i)}, (3)
where σp runs over the set of Nash equilibria of Gp and, for each such σ
p, σ−i runs over
the set of strategies such that u−i(σ
p
i , σ−i) is maximized and σi runs over the strategies
that are i-deviations from either (σpi , σ
p
−i) or (σ
p
i , σ−i). R−i(p) is called risk for player
−i in abandoning the coalition structure p.
We define the probability of deviating from the coalition structure p by making a
comparison between incentive and risk. There are certainly many ways to do such
comparison. In this paper we use a quite intuitive and seemingly natural way to make
it and, in future research, it would be important to investigate some others. Specifically,
we define
τi,−i(p) :=
D−i(p)
D−i(p) +R−i(p)
(4)
and we interpret this number as prior probability that player i assigns to the event
“player −i abandons the coalition structure p”. Therefore τi,∅(p) := 1− τi,−i(p) is inter-
preted as prior probability that nobody abandons the coalition structure p. Now, let
ei,∅(p) be the infimum of payoffs for player i if nobody abandons the coalition structure
p, that is the infimum of payoffs for player i when each player plays according to a
Nash equilibrium of Gp, and let ei,−i(p) be the infimum of payoffs of player i when she
plays according to a Nash equilibrium of Gp and −i plays a (−i)-deviation from a Nash
equilibrium of Gp. The value for player i of the coalition structure p is by definition
vi(p) := ei,∅(p)τi,∅(p) + ei,−i(p)τi,−i(p). (5)
Symmetry implies that vi(p) = vj(p) =: v(p), for all i, j ∈ P . Consequently, there is a
coalition structure p (independent of i) which maximizes v(p). We use the number v(p)
to define common beliefs or, in other words, to make a tacit binding among the players.
Definition 2.1. The induced game Ind(G, p) is the same game as G except for the set of
allowed profiles of strategies: in the induced game only profiles of strategies σ = (σ1, σ2)
such that ui(σ) ≥ v(p), for all i, are allowed.
Observe that the induced game does not depend on the maximizing coalition struc-
ture, that is, in case of multiple coalition structures maximizing the value, one can
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choose one of them casually to define the induced game and this game does not depend
on such choice.
Since the set of allowed strategies in the induced game is convex and compact (and
non-empty) one can compute Nash equilibria of the induced game.
Definition 2.2. A cooperative equilibrium for G is a Nash equilibrium of the game
Ind(G, p).
Observe that this model implicitly assumes that it is common knowledge that both
players apply the same method of reasoning, that is, each player knows that the other
player thinks about coalitions when making her decision. As we elaborate in Section 4,
we believe that this assumption is not unreasonable and may provide a realistic picture
of the mental processes that real subjects perform during the game.
In case of N -player games the idea is to define τi,j(p) for every single player j 6= i
and then use the law of total probabilities to extend this measure to a probability
measure on the set P \ {i}. To use the law of total probabilities we need to know the
probabilities that two or more given players deviate from p. This is easy in situations of
perfect anonimity: one can just assume that the events “player j deviates” and “player k
deviates” are independent and then multiply the respective probabilities. The situation
where a player may influence the choice of another player is much more interesting and
worthy of being explored.
Finally, we observe that the N-person classical social dilemmas in consideration are
computationally very simple, since it is enough to study only the fully selfish coalition
structure ps (in which all players play according to a Nash equilibrium of the original
game) and the fully cooperative coalition structure pc (in which all players play col-
lectively). More formally, given a coalition structure p 6= ps, pc, one has v(p) ≤ v(pc).
Therefore, in order to find a coalition structure that maximizes the value, it is enough
to know the values v(ps) and v(pc).
3. Predictions of the model
Prisoner’s dilemma. We compute the cooperative equilibrium of the Prisoner’s
dilemma in two variants, starting from the one already discussed in Section 1 with
monetary outcomes (expressed in dollars) T = 0.20, R = 0.15, P = 0.05, S = 0. In this
case, the reader can easily check, following the computation sketched in Section 1, that
the cooperative equilibrium is 12C+
1
2D for both players. Notice that in [20] it has been
reported that players cooperated with probability 58 per cent in one treatment and 65
per cent in another treatment and the over-cooperation in the second experiment was
explained in terms of framing effect due to the different ways in which the same game
were presented.
Similar results can be obtained making a comparison between the experimental data
reported in [19] on the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with T = 10, R = 7, P = 3, S = 0
and its cooperative equilibrium: 37 per cent of subjects cooperated in the laboratory,
while the cooperative equilibrium is 14C +
3
4D. We mention that the same experiment
was repeated using MTurk and ten times smaller outcomes, giving a slightly larger
percentage of cooperation (47 per cent). Nevertheless, it was shown in [19] that this
difference was not statistically significant.
Now we consider a parametric Prisoner’s dilemma. Fix k > 0 and consider the
following monetary outcomes: T = k+2, R = k+1, P = 1, S = 0. The intuition suggests
that people should be perfectly selfish for k = 0, they should get more cooperative as
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k increases and they should tend to be perfectly cooperative as k approaches infinity.
This qualitative behavior was indeed observed in iterated treatments in [18].
We show that this is in fact the behavior of the cooperative equilibrium. Indeed, one
obtains that the cooperative equilibrium coincides with Nash equilibrium for k ≤ 1,
while, for k > 1, it is
k − 1
k
C +
1
k
D,
which moves continuously and monotonically from defection to cooperation as k in-
creases and tends to cooperation as k tends to infinity. Note that the fact that the
cooperative equilibrium coincides with Nash equilibrium for k ≤ 1 shows also that Nash
equilibrium and cooperative equilibrium are not disjoint solution concepts. Colloquially
speaking, players get selfish when they understand that cooperating is not fruitful.
Traveler’s dilemma. One has v(ps) = 180, since (180, 180) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of the Traveler’s dilemma, and
v(pc) = 300 ·
b+ 2
2b+ 1
+ (300 − 2b) ·
b− 1
2b+ 1
.
since the unique Nash equilibrium of Gpc is (300, 300), D2(pc) = b − 1, in correspon-
dence of (300, 299), R2(pc) = b+ 2 in correspondence of (298, 299), e1,2(pc) = 300 − 2b
in correspondence of (300, 300 − b), and clearly e1,∅(pc) = 300 in correspondence of
(300, 300).
Consequently the cooperative equilibrium strongly depends on b: the predicted claims
get smaller as b get larger. In other words, cooperation is more difficult as the bonus/penalty
increases. This behaviour has been indeed qualitatively observed both in one-shot and
iterated games [38], [16], [17], and [39]. We are aware of only two experimental studies
devoted to one-shot Traveler’s dilemmas. For these experiments, the prediction of the
the cooperative equilibrium are even quantitatively close. Indeed, (1) for b = 5 one
finds that the unique cooperative equilibrium is a suitable convex combinations of the
strategies 296 and 297. This meets the experimental data reported in [16], where they
observed that about 80 per cent of the subjects played a strategy between 290 and 300
with an average of 295; (2) For b = 180, one has v(pc) < v(ps), and then the cooperative
equilibrium coincides with the Nash equilibrium. This matches the experimental data
reported in [16], where they observed that about 80 per cent of the players played the
Nash equilibrium; (3) For b = 2 and strategy sets {2, 3, . . . , 100}, in [17] it has been
reported that 38 out of 45 game theorists chose a strategy between 90 and 100 and 28
of them chose a strategy between 97 and 100. In this case v(pc) = 99.2 and therefore
the cooperative equilibrium is close to the pure strategy 99.
Public good game. The unique Nash equilibrium is xi = 0, for all i, in correspon-
dence of which each player gets y. Consequently v(ps) = y. On the other hand, one
has
v(pc) = 2αy ·
2α− 1
α
+ αy ·
1− α
α
= (3α− 1)y.
Therefore, v(pc) ≤ v(ps) if and only if α ≤
2
3 . In other words, when α is small - recall
that α is assumed to belong to the interval (12 , 1) - the cooperative equilibrium reduces
to Nash equilibrium and the larger is α the larger is the rate of cooperation predicted by
the cooperative equilibrium. The fact that human behavior depends on α in this way has
been indeed observed several times (see, e.g., [14], [40]). As a quantitative comparison,
we consider the experimental data reported in [41], with α = 0.8. We normalize y to be
equal to 1 (in the experiment y = 0.04 dollars). In this case the cooperative equilibrium
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is supported between 0.66 and 0.67. In [41] it has been reported that the average of
contributions was 0.50, but the mode was 0.60 (6 out of 32 times) followed by 0.80 (5
out of 32 times).
Tragedy of the Commons. One easily sees that the Tragedy of the Commons and
the Public Goods game represent the same strategic situation, just by setting α := k
h
,
that can be interpreted as the effective cost of having a sheep. In particular, one finds
that v(pc) > v(ps) if and only if α >
2
3 .
Comparison between the Prisoner’s dilemma and Chicken. It has been ob-
served in [42] that the rate of cooperation in the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma is sig-
nificantly less than the rate of cooperation in the iterated Chicken game3 with similar
payoffs, that is, with payoffs such that the average payoffs across outcomes is the same in
both games. We now show that this behavior is predicted by the cooperative equilibrium
in one-shot games, giving a qualitative explanation of why we observe more cooperation
in the iterated Chicken game than in the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma 4. The payoffs
used in [42] are T = 400, R = 300,D = 0, S = −100 for the Prisoner’s dilemma and
T = 300, R = 200, S = 100,D = 0 for the Chicken game. One finds that the cooperative
equilibrium of this variant of the Prisoner’s dilemma is 23C +
1
3D and the cooperative
equilibrium of this variant of the Chicken game coincides with the evolutionarily stable
strategy 67C +
1
7D. So the rate of cooperation predicted by the cooperative equilibrium
is significantly higher in the Chicken game.
4. Conclusions
Many experiments over the years have shown that humans may act cooperatively
even in one-shot social dilemmas without forms of external controls and the rate of
cooperation depends on the payoffs. This suggests that humans have attitude to coop-
eration by nature and therefore they do not act a priori as single players, as typically
assumed in economics, but they forecast how the game would be played if they formed
coalitions and then they play according to their most optimistic forecast.
We have formalized this idea assuming that each player makes an evaluation of the
probability that another player abandons the collective interest to follow her private
interest. This probability is defined by making a comparison between incentive and risk
to deviate from the collective interest and gives rise to common beliefs that, mathe-
matically, correspond to define a suitable restriction of the original game. On the one
hand, this procedure seems qualitatively reasonable and we believe it provides a real-
istic picture of the mental processes that real subjects perform during the game. On
the other hand, the formalization of this process, that is, the definitions of the risk,
incentive, probabilities, and the induced game, is mathematically simple and seemingly
3We recall that the Chicken game is basically the same as the Prisoner’s dilemma except for the
fact that payoffs are subject to the condition T > R > S > P . The Chicken game has two pure Nash
equilibria, (C,D) and (D,C), and a symmetric evolutionarily stable mixed Nash equilibrium depending
on the payoffs. Observe that ei,∅(ps) = P , since it is the infimum of payoffs of player i when each player
plays in according to a Nash equilibrium. Such infimum is attained in correspondence to the profile of
strategies (D,D).
4The expression qualitative explanation stands for the fact that, of course, a direct comparison
between iterated and one-shot games cannot be done, since the former have a much richer set of
strategies. Nevertheless, we find quite remarkable the fact that this difference in behavior observed in
iterated treatments is predicted for one-shot treatments: we believe that this connection is not casual
and deserves to be investigate better.
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natural but certainly deserves to be investigated better and possibly improved in future
research.
However, the actual model makes us optimistic about this direction of research, be-
ing the first predictive model able to: (1) make satisfactorily accurate predictions of
population average behavior in social dilemmas; (2) explain a number of experimental
findings, such as the fact that the rate of cooperation in the Prisoner’s dilemma in-
creases when the cost-benefit ratio decreases, the rate of cooperation in the Traveler’s
dilemma increases when the bonus/penalty decreases, the rate of cooperation in the
Public Goods game increases when the pro-capite marginal return increases, the rate of
cooperation in the Chicken game is larger than the rate of cooperation in the Prisoner’s
dilemma with similar payoffs.
The dream is to incorporate other components (as family history, age, culture, incen-
tives, iterations, etc.) into the model in order to make individual-level predictions.
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